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Why does deterrence prevent nuclear war but not crime?

Since Russia first invaded Ukraine, the threat of nuclear war has increased. This is not the first time this has happened. During the cold war the United States and the Russian Federation, reached a stalemate that prevented nuclear war by promising mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.). M.A.D. rests on the belief that a nuclear attack by one superpower would be met with an overwhelming nuclear counterattack where both the attacker and the defender would be destroyed (Lindelauf, 2021). This belief is firmly rooted in the principle of deterrence.

What is deterrence theory?

Embedded in classical criminology, deterrence theory asserts that people are rational beings in the pursuit of their own self-interests (Rocker, 2021). Deterrence as a proactive crime reduction strategy works by promoting the threat of punishment to discourage people from committing crime. The deterrent effects are ultimately determined by offender perceptions of punishment risk and certainty of apprehension (Nagin, 2018). Beyond crime, deterrence applications range from fraud prevention, (Petro, Martin, Wadecki, & Cendrowski, 2007); drug cartels, (Abrantes-Metz, & Metz, 2019); drunk driving, (Stringer, 2021), and even space warfare, (Jafri, A., & Stevenson, 2018).

Three reasons why deterrence has not reduced crime

If deterrence strategies prevent nuclear war, then why not apply them to prevent crime? Deterrence strategies have failed to reduce crime for three reasons; receiving punishment for criminal behavior is neither certain, severe nor swift. For deterrence to be effective, it must ensure that any punishing consequences are certain, severe, and swift. Certainty means that the greater the perception of being caught, the less likely someone will engage in criminal behavior. Severity means that the greater intensity of punishment, the more effectively it reduces criminal behavior. Swiftness means that faster punishment is more effective at preventing criminal behavior than delayed punishment.

Deterrence has worked for nuclear war because each of these three components of deterrence is aggressively applied. Specifically, the principle of certainty is maintained in that missile storage facilities are blast-resistant and buried underground or deep underwater on submarines to protect from an attack. Also, hundreds of satellites are keeping an eye on nuclear forces from above. The principle of severity is reflected in the United States’ current nuclear arsenal. The most powerful bomb is the B83, with a yield of 1.2 megatons, making it 60 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 (Church, 2015). Finally, the principle of swiftness. It takes thirty minutes or less for intercontinental missiles to deliver their payloads (Freedman, & Michaels, 2019). While deterrence has effectively held nuclear war in check, imagine if we aggressively applied the three components of deterrence to reduce crime.

Certainty of punishment:

The evidence in support of certainty’s deterrent effect concerns the perception of the likelihood of apprehension (Pickett, 2018). Currently, the punishment a person receives for committing a crime is not certain, it depends on many factors. These variables include whether it is your first offense, your age, the jurisdiction you committed the crime, and the quality of the legal defense you can afford. A criminal’s behavior is more likely to be influenced by seeing a police officer with handcuffs and a radio than by a new law increasing penalties. The police deter crime when they do things that increases a criminal’s perception of the certainty of being caught. These include strategies that use the police as sentries, increased patrols, highly observable vehicles, uncreased police stations, and use of hot spots policing (a strategy that involves the targeting of resources and activities to those places where crime is most concentrated) (Chainey, Estévez-Soto, Pezzuchi, & Serrano–Berthet, 2022).

Severity of punishment:

Deterrence theory predicts that more severe punishments reduce crime (Nagin, 2018). Nevertheless, our criminal justice systems apply punishment in a manner opposite of deterrence theory suggests. First offenses are frequently given the minimum severity of punishment, if any. Additionally, some jurisdictions apply what is known as three strikes laws. In this criminal sentencing approach, significantly harsher punishments are imposed on repeated offenders after the third offence. Research shows that using minimum severity desensitizes offenders to the consequences of their actions (Zhang, 2021).

Swiftness of punishment:

A punishment imposed immediately after an offence is more effective than one that is delayed (Duŝek, 2015). When given the choice, research subjects prefer immediate punishment over delayed punishment (Jaynes, & Wilson, 2021). However, in most criminal justice systems, convictions and sentencing often take months or years (Warner, Bartels, & Gelb, 2022). These delays in prosecution are due to a backlog of cases, post-conviction motions, gathering mitigating evidence, and jury trials (Shymansky, 2020).

The criminal justice system is still exploring the deterrence effects of certainty and severity and swiftness. Initial findings suggest that aggressively applying the three principles of deterrence may result in a criminal justice system where criminals are apprehended more frequently, punished quickly and more severely (Stringer, 2021; Truelove, Freeman, Watson, Kaye, & Davey, 2020; Roche, Wilson, & Pickett, 2020).

An aggressive deterrence approach for crime would transform society in unprecedented ways. Under a deterrence-based criminal justice system, crimes would always be prosecuted, followed by a speedy trial and the highest levels of sentencing. There would be no room for extended death penalty deliberations, mitigating circumstances and in the age of artificial intelligence, what happens to deterrence when decisions can be made at machine speeds (Wong, et al., 2020).

The question remains, are we willing to live under a criminal justice system that aggressively uses deterrence to reduce crime?


References

Abrantes-Metz, R. M., & Metz, A. (2019). The Future of Cartel Deterrence and Detection. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January.

Chainey, S. P., Estévez-Soto, P. R., Pezzuchi, G., & Serrano–Berthet, R. (2022). An evaluation of a hot spot policing programme in four Argentinian cities. The Police Journal, 0032258X221079019.

Duŝek, L. (2015) Time to punishment: The effects of a shorter criminal procedure on crime rates. International Review of Law and Economics, 43, 134–47.

Jafri, A., & Stevenson, J. A. (2018). Space Deterrence: The Vulnerability-Credibility Tradeoff in Space Domain Deterrence Stability. NSI, Inc. Boston United States.

Jaynes, C. M., & Wilson, T. (2021). Dreading delayed punishment: Reconceptualizing sanction “celerity”. Journal of Crime and Justice, 1-19.

Lindelauf, R. (2021). Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age: Game Theory Revisited. NL ARMS, 421.

Nagin, D. S. (2013). Deterrence in the twenty-first century. Crime and justice, 42(1), 199-263.

Nagin, D. S. (2018). Deterrent effects of the certainty and severity of punishment. In Deterrence, choice, and crime (pp. 157-185). Routledge.

Church, A. M. (2015). Gallery of USAF weapons. Air Force Magazine, 98(5), 80-103.

Freedman, L., & Michaels, J. (2019). ICBM Vulnerability. In The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (pp. 483-494). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Petro, L. W., Martin, J. P., Wadecki, A. A., & Cendrowski, H. (2007). The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons.

Pickett, J. T. (2018). Using behavioral economics to advance deterrence research and improve crime policy: Some illustrative experiments. Crime & Delinquency, 64(12), 1636-1659.

Wong, Y. H., Yurchak, J. M., Button, R. W., Frank, A., Laird, B., Osoba, O. A., ... & Bae, S. J. (2020). Deterrence in the age of thinking machines. RAND Corporation Santa Monica.

Roche, S. P., Wilson, T., & Pickett, J. T. (2020). Perceived control, severity, certainty, and emotional fear: Testing an expanded model of deterrence. Journal of research in crime and delinquency, 57(4), 493-531.

Rocker, D. (2021). Deterrence research. The encyclopedia of research methods in criminology and criminal justice, 2, 589-595.

Shymansky, R. (2020). Justice Diseased is Justice Denied: Coronavirus, Court Closures, and Criminal Trials. West Virginia Law Review Online, 122(1), 1.

Truelove, V., Freeman, J., Watson, B., Kaye, S. A., & Davey, J. (2020). Are perceptions of penalties stable across time? The problem of causal ordering in deterrence applied to road safety. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 146, 105746.

Stringer, R. J. (2021). Drunk driving and deterrence: exploring the reconceptualized deterrence hypothesis and self-reported drunk driving. Journal of crime and justice, 44(3), 316-331.

Warner, K., Bartels, L., & Gelb, K. (2022). Jurisdictional differences in sentencing practice: Insights from the National Jury Sentencing study. Judicial Officers Bulletin, 34(3), 27-31.

Zhang, T. (2021). Fitzgerald v R-The Futility of New Zealand's Three Strikes Law. Auckland UL Rev., 27, 428.


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