A court or tribunal will not raise a limitation (or prescription) issue if no party does, and in a formal way; in civil litigation, to mention ‘laches, delay and acquiescence’ in the pleadings is not enough: Kearney v Kearney [2026] NSWCA 43 (Adamson JA, with whom Ward P concurred, and McHugh JA).

In Kuvera Properties Pte Ltd v Far East Opus Pte Ltd [2026] SGCA 34, the Court suggested at [25] a framework for dealing with a limitation issue raised by a defendant:

[W]hen a court is faced with a claim that the claimant’s action has been commenced out of time due to the operation of a limitation period, the court should adopt a systematic approach that considers the following issues in order:

(a) First, the court should identify the cause(s) of action which the claimant has advanced.

(b) Second, the court should identify the applicable limitation period(s) (if any) for the cause(s) of action that the claimant has advanced.

(c) Third, the court should consider when the limitation period(s) started to run against the claimant for the cause(s) of action advanced.

(d) Fourth, the court should determine whether the claimant had commenced its action for its cause(s) of action within the limitation period(s).

(especially for the main text to n 56) How do limitation provisions deal with requests for a declaration, rather than ‘some form of substantive relief’? Discussed in a B2B construction context in relation to adjudication and to the English law of limitation, Lord Mance (giving the judgment of the court) in Aspect Contracts (Asbestos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc [2015] UKSC 38 laid down the principle that declaratory relief might still be available after a substantive claim was time-barred; but to ask for a declaration that a contractual right has accrued or that a breach of contract has occurred would be barred if an action for damages arising out of the same facts was already barred. These issues, and relevant later English case law, are discussed in a Singapore context (with identical relevant statutory provisions), by AR Elton Tan Xue Yang in Nasrat Lucas Muzayyin v The Tyrell Solution Pte Ltd [2025] SGHCR 38. 

The Supreme Court in URS v BDW [2025] UKSC 21 acknowledged at [70]ff that the House of Lords in Pirelli (n 60) wrongly assumed that building defects counted as ‘physical damage’, rather than ‘pure economic loss’ (the need to spend money on rectification, or a drop in the value of the building); and may have been wrong in asserting, in relation to what would now be termed pure economic loss, that time starts running before the defect was discovered or even reasonably discoverable. But at Supreme Court level the point was not fully argued, so the possibility of overruling Pirelli did not arise. Consistent with Pirelli, Coulson LJ in the Court of Appeal at [2023] EWCA Civ 772, 209 Con LR 24, [2023] BLR 437, [2024] KB 827 (summarised at n 60 in the book) provides the most recent authority on accrual of the cause of action in a construction defect context. The Supreme Court also pronounced on the start of the specially short period for a claim against a third party by way of contribution: see the update above to section [9.7.3].

In Singapore, buyers of shop units argued that the usable size (and other aspects) of their units had been misrepresented by the developers. Their ‘cause of action accrued’ not when they committed to buy but when they took possession, at that point for the first time seeing what they had bought: Cheung Teck Cheong Richard v LVND Investments Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC 161 (Wong Li Kok Alex J).

For discussion of limitation rules and ‘accrual’ of a cause of action in tort for defective construction work – with comparisons from a range of common law jurisdictions – see Kevin Touhey, ‘It’s always the First Place You Look: Finding Harm and Completing the Cause of Action in Negligence for a Defective Building’ (2026) 43 International Construction Law Review 306.

In URS v BDW [2025] UKSC 21 at [78]ff the Supreme Court confirmed the effect of the Building Safety Act 2022 s 135, as understood by the Court of Appeal: it extends (where necessary, as in this case, revives) the limitation period retrospectively to 30 years for claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (E&W) s 1 which had ‘accrued’ even before the commencement date of that BSA provision. This covers proceedings already ongoing at that date, like BDW’s action against URS. Without a solvent developer (or other) defendant now, legally responsible for work done long ago, this extra time will not help claimants; and a claim on insurance may not be assisted by the BSA 2022 s 135.

(especially for n 72) A useful summary of the doctrine of laches comes from Audrey Lim J in Lin Tze Kin v Lim Sze Ong [2026] SGHC 129 at [156], quoting earlier case law [emphasis in the original]:

Laches is a doctrine of equity. It is properly invoked where essentially there has been a substantial lapse of time coupled with circumstances where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver thereof; or, where by his conduct and neglect he had, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him, if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted … This is a broad-based inquiry and it would be relevant to consider the length of delay before the claim was brought, the nature of the prejudice said to be suffered by the defendant, as well as any element of unconscionability in allowing the claim to be enforced …

(especially for the main text to n 80) On the history and meaning of ‘specialty’ in the Limitation Act 1980 (E&W) s 8(1) and on the possibility that certain types of claim or action may have no statutory limitation period at all in English law, see THG Plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2026] UKSC 6. The same idea also appears in Singapore law in Kuvera Properties Pte Ltd v Far East Opus Pte Ltd [2026] SGCA 34. The case also analyses the limitation periods applicable to claims relying on the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (shared between English and Singapore law); rights and remedies under the Act are discussed in the book at section [4.4.4]. The limitation position of claims by consumers relying on rights or remedies in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) or its Irish equivalent seems not yet to have reached the courts.

(especially for n 84) In addition to special rules limiting the possibility of modifying or adding a claim or defence once the limitation period has run out, general procedural rules may require such changes to satisfy a series of discretionary tests, even if made at an earlier stage: in English law, see IDDQD v Codeberry [2025] EWHC 712 (Ch) (Judge Bacon). A Court of Appeal case about the breadth of the court’s discretion in English law to substitute a party after expiry of the limitation period is now (August 2026) listed for hearing in the Supreme Court: Adcamp LLP v Office Properties PL Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 50.

On the Limitation Act 1980 (E&W) s 32 (the impact of fraud, concealment or mistake on the starting of the limitation period in tort, including for claims of deceit), see Transworld Payment Solutions UK Ltd v First Curaçao International Bank NV [2025] EWHC 2480 (Ch) [614]ff (Leech J). Arif v Sanger [2025] EWHC 1540 (KB), applying Seedo v El Gamal [2023] EWCA Civ 330 at [70]ff (Nugee LJ, Birss and Bean LJJ concurring) considers when separate allegedly fraudulent representations together constitute a single cause of action with its own starting point for limitation purposes, or separate causes of action. On the test of ‘reasonable diligence’ – to discover a fraud – and on proof of loss caused by the deceit, see Mather v Rattan [2025] EWCA Civ 1596 (Snowden LJ, with whom Males and Lewison LJJ concurred). The New Zealand Supreme Court in Whangarei DC v Daisley [2026] NZSC 72 considered in depth the pre-2011 NZ legislation on fraudulent concealment, considering the UKSC’s views on the equivalent English rules in Canada Square (n 85 in the book). The majority judgment concluded at [124]: 

[T]here must be actual knowledge (or, in cases of wilful blindness, imputed awareness) both of the essential facts constituting the cause of action, and that those facts together involve a wrongful act against the plaintiff.

(especially for n 89) Ben Parker (BBC News, Suffolk) reported on 10 June 2025: [St Francis] ‘Tower Block Residents Unable to Return for a Year’.

On the Limitation Act 1980 s 14A, recent Court of Appeal authority – in the context of a professional negligence claim against a firm of solicitors and illustrating divergences of judicial approach – comes from Kay v Martineau Johnson [2026] EWCA Civ 224.

For a Singapore court engaging with its equivalent provisions to English law on latent defects, knowledge and the start of the limitation period, see Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 4099 v KTP Consultants Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC(A) 32.

For the operation of the pre-2011 ‘accrual of the cause of action’ rules, defining the normal start date for time running, see Whangarei DC v Daisley [2026] NZSC 72, also discussed in the update above to section [10.5.3].

For a ‘leaky building’ case and the ‘late knowledge date’ provisions of the Limitation Act 2010 (NZ) s 14, see To’o v Wellington City Council [2025] NZHC 216, discussed in the update above to section [4.14.1]. 

For the English equivalent (Limitation Act 1980 (E&W) s 10) of NZ’s special limitation rule for contribution proceedings, see the update above to section [9.7.3].

In The Owners – Strata Plan 87003 v Raysons Constructions Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 66, Leeming JA considered the limitation rules applying to actions for breaches of the NSWHBA statutory warranties, in the Act’s s 18E(1)(e), especially the triggers for the relevant times starting to run. He set out his overall interpretation of the provision at [84]:

If there is an actual defect or deficiency which not only becomes apparent in the first 18 months or 5½ years following completion but which also is rectified, such that no one is aware of any other breach of statutory warranty resulting in a further defect or deficiency and there is no longer any proper basis to consider that there has been a breach of statutory warranty resulting in a further defect or deficiency, then a plaintiff will not for that reason be disentitled from commencing proceedings in the additional six months provided for by s 18E(1)(e) if some claim for breach of warranty first becomes apparent in the last six months of the warranty period.

Rees J gave detailed consideration to NSW’s 10-year longstop (currently under s 6.20 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) – see the update to section [3.6.1] for its proposed new home in the Building (Approvals and Practitioners) Act 2026 (NSW)) in Fortius Broadway No 1 Pty Ltd v ACN 103 211 141 Pty Ltd (formerly known as Watpac Construction (NSW) Pty Ltd) [2026] NSWSC 710, a case involving defects claims (including planter pots falling to the ground) arising from the architecturally-striking One Central Park development in Sydney. This included analysis of NZ’s Beca Carter Hollings & Ferner (n 110), which she observed (at [72]) to ‘illustrate competing considerations in the interpretation of s 6.20… with alacrity’.

Illustrating the continuing relevance to modern Irish law of the English law of limitation before the Statute of Limitations 1957 (Ire), see Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC v McDaid [2026] IECA 134 (Costello and McDonald JJ) at [14]ff.

(especially for the main text to n 146) Smith v Cunningham (IESC) and linked earlier cases, considering when ‘damage’ occurs in pure economic loss cases, starting time running, were relied on in Casey v Governor & Company of Bank of Ireland [2025] IECA 66 (Costello J), overturning the High Court below:

[59] It is clear from the authorities that one approach is to ask when could the deceased have sued the appellants? The answer is when ‘provable injury capable of attracting compensation occurred’ and that is when it is ‘available to be proved’. At [60] in Smith, the question is when was an ‘immediate, measurable economic disadvantage’ or a loss which is ‘sufficiently measurable’ sustained? Once that has been sustained, then the time starts to run for the purposes of the statute.

For the impact of the statutory Scots law prescription rules – with special provisions for continuing breaches and fraud or error, now modified by the 2018 Act – see Multiplex Construction Europe Ltd v Nightingale Architects Ltd [2025] CSOH 58 (Lord Braid). This is satellite litigation (a Preliminary Proof) to cladding-related claims by employer against main contractor in Glasgow’s Queen Elizabeth University Hospital project, with the project architects and others ‘convened’ – brought in as third-party defenders. Neither of the statutory ‘escape routes’ was engaged: under s 6(4) of the 1973 Act, the employer’s unawareness of the defects was not induced by the main contractor’s error, but in any event the five-year prescription period restarted (enough to have ‘run out’ before litigation was started, seven years after practical completion) when the employer failed to undertake those checks on build quality and compliance which it should reasonably have done. 

Further litigation from the same project, similarly on prescription issues and the 1973 Act (before the 2018 Act), is reported as Greater Glasgow Health Board v Multiplex Construction Europe Ltd [2026] CSIH 16. Here, too, the commercial judge held that GGHB did not know about the non-compliant ACM cladding, but failed to prove as a matter of fact that it had been induced into error by Multiplex. In any event GGHB could with reasonable diligence have discovered the alleged error in time. Lord Pentland in the Inner House was unconvinced that the commercial judge reached conclusions which were ‘plainly wrong’ on the evidence before him. 

For further discussion, in a B2B construction context, of how the 1973 Act applies to a range of possible claims in contract – some related to allegedly non-compliant cladding – see Ogilvie Construction Ltd v M1 RE Glasgow Ltd [2026] CSOH 44 (Lord Lake).

The Court of Session has also confirmed, reviewing extensive case law, that a civil claim for breach of contract started in court within the standard five-year statutory period normally stops time running in relation to that claim, provided that it gives ‘sufficiently fair notice of the nature of the claims being advanced at the outset and that nature has undergone no fundamental change [in later procedural stages]’: Lord Sandison in Pipeline Cleaning Solutions Ltd v Coretrax Technology Ltd [2025] CSOH 122 at [61]. In the case itself, the defender was still free to argue that the prescription period had already elapsed before the first claim was made. Scots law, like English law – see the main text to n 84 in section [10.5.2] – has doctrines seeking to protect a defender against changes being made in the basis of the claim or the remedies sought once the prescription (or limitation) period has expired, though the original claim was clearly ‘in time’.

Like English (and Irish) law, Scots law includes special time limit rules in relation to claims for personal injury, under the current text of the 1973 Act ss 17-18, with special rules for claims under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK): the 1973 Act’s Part IIA; neither are discussed in the book. For the English equivalents, for personal injury actions in general, see the main text to nn 90-91 in section [10.5.3]; under the 1987 Act, see section [5.10.5]. Time limits have become problematic, as in English law, about mesothelioma, an incurable fatal lung condition with a long latency period, often linked to occupational asbestos exposure. 

Statutory reform was announced by the Scottish Government in June 2026: ‘Fairer Time Limits for Mesothelioma Patients’.

(especially for n 169) For an example from Scotland of a potential claim for personal injuries lost by failing to advise in time on considering starting proceedings in England, combined with the ‘loss of a chance’ cases like Perry v Raleys Solicitors [2019] UKSC 5, [2020] AC 352, defining how negligent legal advice might result in liability, and for what, see Gough v Cannons Law Practice [2025] CSOH 28 (Lord Richardson). If litigation reaches court but is then ‘prescribed’, the pursuers’ solicitors being negligently responsible, the recoverable damages will certainly include the court’s allocation to that party of the expenses of the failed case (‘costs’, in English terminology): see Drouet v BTO Solicitors LLP [2026] CSOH 66 (Lord Cubie).

From England, see Siem v Womble Bond Dickinson [2026] EWHC 1168 (Ch): a spectacular professional negligence action, with £50m claimed and one of the claimants allegedly having spent over £3m in costs before the three-week trial. At [190]ff Richards J explained how judges deal with a ‘counterfactual’ – the scenario a claimant asserts would have had at least a measurable chance of resulting, had the defendants’ alleged negligence not taken place. In the case itself, the judge rejected the proposed counterfactual as unrealistically unlikely, as well as the claims of breaches of duty by the defendant solicitors. An equally instructive professional negligence example is Gordeno v Irwin Mitchell LLP [2026] EWHC 136 (Ch), where counterfactuals, the types of recoverable loss and their quantification were centre stage. From Australia, on the pleading requirements for counterfactuals, see Singh v Singh Homes Pty Ltd [2026] VSCA 191 at [68]ff (McLeish, Walker and Donaghue JJA) and R Lawyers in the HCA, quoted below. For an example of a counterfactual in action about a home purchase, see section [5.9.5] in the book and its update above.

On the liability of a firm of solicitors for failure to serve a claim form during the limitation period, see Mitchell v Leigh Day [2025] EWHC 1081 (KB) (Master Stevens). For a reminder that the terms of a solicitor’s retainer usually limit the scope of the solicitor’s potential liability, see Michael James Cochrane v Harper Macleod LLP [2025] SC GLA 75 (Sheriff DN Taylor). For a similar approach to loss of a chance from the High Court of Australia (Gageler CJ, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ), see R Lawyers v Mr Daily [2025] HCA 41 at [42]: 

To establish his case against R Lawyers in negligence [in both contract and tort], it was necessary for Mr Daily [the client] to prove on the balance of probabilities that the breaches of the duty of care owed to him by R Lawyers were a cause of loss or damage ‘(in the sense of detrimental difference)’. While that standard of proof is not exacting and ‘does not require certainty or precision’, that standard is not discharged by merely proving the loss of a possible chance of a better outcome. In some contexts, a lost opportunity may constitute loss or damage in tort; even in those cases, the opportunity must itself be of some value: it must be shown that there was a ‘substantial prospect of a beneficial outcome’ but for breach of the duty of care.

On other aspects of ‘counterfactuals’, see the updates above to section [5.9.5].

The Building (Developer Bond) Regulations 2026 (Vic) support the regime foreshadowed in n 176, with the regime essentially to apply to residential apartment buildings for which the building permit is issued after 1 July 2027 (reg 8). Further exemptions to the scheme (by way of amendments to the Building Act 1993 (Vic)) are set out in pt 12A div 3 of the Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2026 (Vic).